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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TIME AND PLACE OF MAKING OF CONTRACT WHERE OFFER IS MADE
BY MAIL AND ACCEPTANCE BY TELEGRAM OR THE REVERSE
Since a contract is created when the offer is accepted, and
both the time and place of contract is the time and place where
the acceptance becomes effective, a pertinent inquiry is: Is a
mailed offer accepted at the time and place when and where
a telegram of acceptance is delivered by the offeree to the tele-
graph company, or is it accepted only when the telegram is
received by the offeror ? For example, in Shurter et al. v. Ricker,'
defendant, a married woman in New York, sent a letter to the
plaintiff in Texas offering to borrow money. The plaintiff wired
assent from Texas and the money was given. In an action for
the money, if it was a Texas contract it would have been void,
because the debtor was a married woman, whereas under New
York law the wife would be liable as though she were a ferne
sole. The court held the telegram of acceptance was effective
only when received by the wife in New York and that New York
law governed.
To discuss this point, cases wherein mailed offers are accepted
by mail and where offers by telegram are accepted by mail or
telegram must also be treated. Of course, if the offer provides
the manner, time, or place of acceptance, its terms must be com-
plied with in order to create a contract. 2 Such cases are
beyond the scope of this discussion. Only the cases wherein the
offer is silent on the mode of acceptance will be dealt with.
Various reasons are assigned by the courts for holding that a
telegraphic acceptance of a mailed offer is or is not effective
when put in the control of the telegraph company. The reasons
vary equally regarding other means of communications. It is
quite generally accepted today that a mailed acceptance of a
mailed offer is effective when posted, but the courts have not
agreed as to the reason therefor.
The theory of agency has been invoked, and it has been held
that the mail is the common agent of both offeror and offeree.5
1 62 F. (2d) 489 (1933), certiorari denied without opinion in 289 U. S.
732, 77 L. Ed. 1481, 53 S. Ct. 593 (1933).
2 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts (American
Law Institute Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1932) I, sec. 61;
William Herbert Page, The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Cincinnati, Ohio:
The W. H. Anderson Company, 1920), I, sec. 206; 13 Corpus Juris 279.
3 Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co. v. Grant, L. R. 4
Exch. Div. 216, 48 L. J. Ex. 577, 41 L. T. 298, 27 W. R. 858 (1878) ; Lucas
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131 Iowa 669, 109 N. W. 191, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1016 (1906).
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However, this theory fails, because if the letter of acceptance is
lost or delayed, it is held that the contract was, nevertheless,
complete when the acceptance was posted and the consequences
of the loss or delay are charged to the offeror. This can hardly
be done if the post office is the agent of both offeror and offeree.
The offeror should not suffer more than the offeree for the mis-
take of a common agent.
It has also been held that the post office is the agent only
of the offeror and that depositing the letter in the mail is, in
effect, delivery to the offeror.4 This is sheer fiction. Agency in-
cludes both authorization and control. There is in fact no au-
thorization, and clearly there is no control. Further, in some
cases, mailing an acceptance has been held to create a contract
even where the offer was not made by mail. 5 The theory of
agency could not apply in such cases. So also, the courts are
tending to abandon this theory where the offer is made by tele-
gram. The trend of the modern decisions is that the telegraph
company is not the agent of the sender but rather is an inde-
pendent principal or contracting party, and the offeror is not
bound if the company changes or alters the terms of the offer
and it is so delivered to the offeree. 6
Some of the courts have recognized the fallacy of the agency
rule and have applied the doctrine of "implied authorization" to
use only the same means in accepting as was used in making the
offer.7 This was suggested in Lucas v. Weser. Union Tleg rv h
Company, s where the court stated: "The proposition of an ex-
change was made to plaintiff by letter. In committing it, prop-
erly addressed, to the mails for transmission, the post office be-
came the agent of Sas to carry the offer, he taking the chances
of delays in the transmission .... Having sent the proposition by
mail he impliedly authorized its acceptance through the same
agency. Such implication arises (1) when the post is used to
make the offer and no other mode is suggested, and (2) when
4 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424 (1838) ; Shurter v. Ricker, 62 F. (2d)
489 (1933).
5 Henthorn v. Fraser, L. R. 2 Ch. 27, 61 L. J. Ch. 373, 66 L. T. 439, 40
W. R. 433 (1892) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 31 Ky. L.
714, 103 S. W. 317, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439 (1907) ; Scottish-American
Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 504, 74 S. W. 17 (1903).
6 13 Corpus Juris 300.
7 Scottish-American Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 504, 74 S. W. 17
(1903); Lucas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131 Iowa 669, 109 N. W. 191,
6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1016 (1906); Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Co. v. Kentucky
River Coal Co., 20 F. (2d) 67 (1927) ; Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F. (2d) 415
(1929).
8 131 Iowa 669, 109 N. W. 191, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1016 (1906).
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the circumstances are such that it must have been within the
contemplation of the parties that the post would be used in
making the answer .... The contract is complete in such a case
when the letter containing the acceptance is properly addressed
and deposited in the United States mails. . . . This is on the
ground that the offerer, by depositing this letter in the post
office, selects a common agency through which to conduct the
negotiations, and the delivery of the letter to it is in effect a
delivery to the offerer."
This theory is also illogical. An offeree needs no authorization
to use any mode of communication he wishes. He should be per-
mitted to accept in whatever manner he wishes and without
"implied authority" to use only one means of becoming bound
if the offeror does not condition his offer on one mode of accept-
ance. In Henthorn v. Fraser,9 the plaintiff, a nonresident of
Liverpool, while in that city was handed an option by the de-
fendant to purchase property. He took the offer home with him,
and the next day he mailed a letter of acceptance. Some of the
lord justices held the acceptance effective when mailed, because
the offeror contemplated that the offeree would accept by post
and therefore gave the offeree "implied authority" to send his
acceptance by mail, but Herschell, L. J., stated: "It strikes me
as somewhat artificial to speak of the person to whom the offer
is made as having the implied authority to transmit the accept-
ance through any particular channel; he may select what means
he pleases, the Post Office no less than any other."
Perhaps the logical theory is that an acceptance by mail or
by telegram is customary and is therefore impliedly assented to
by the offeror as the means of binding him when he makes his
offer. The fact is that in cases of this nature the parties expect
that the letter or telegram of acceptance when deposited in the
mails or delivered to the telegraph company will be duly trans-
mitted; they do not contemplate the consequences of the delay
or loss of such an acceptance. It must be remembered that a con-
tract is founded on the agreement of the parties, an offer by one
and acceptance of that offer by the other. The offeror is bound
when acceptance is personally made to him. But he may dispense
with personal notification by indicating another mode of accept-
ance which he will treat as binding upon him. This indication
may be made expressly'0 or impliedly.11 It may be implied if the
9 L. R. 2 Ch. 27, 61 L. J. Ch. 373, 66 L. T. 439, 40 W. R. 433 (1892).
10 William Herbert Page, The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Cincinnati, Ohio:
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offeror could fairly contemplate at the time he makes his offer
that the offeree would use a mode other than personal notification
for acceptance. What might fairly be in the contemplation of
the offeror is not what he may secretly intend but what may be
inferred from the circumstances of the case and what is cus-
tomary in similar transactions at the time when and the place
where the offer is received. By failing expressly to indicate the
mode of acceptance, he impliedly assents to be bound by such
an acceptance.
In Henthorn v. Fraser,1 2 Kay, L. J., stated: "Posting an
acceptance of an offer may be sufficient where it can fairly be
inferred from the circumstances of the case that the acceptance
might be sent by post."
In Bishop v. Eaton13 the court says: "What kind of notice is
required depends upon the nature of the transaction, the
situation of the parties, and the inferences fairly to be drawn
from their previous dealings, if any, in regard to the matter.
If they are so situated that communication by letter is naturally
to be expected, then the deposit of a letter in the mail is all that
is necessary."
These principles were adopted in the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts'4 as set forth in sections 61, 64, 66 and 68:
"If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of accept-
ance its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to
create a contract. if an offer merely suggests a permitted place,
time or manner of acceptance, another method of acceptance is
not precluded."
"An acceptance may be transmitted by any means which
the offeror has authorized the offeree to use and, if so trans-
mitted, is operative and completes the contract as soon as put
out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever
reaches the offeror, unless the offer otherwise provides."
"An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the means used
by the offeror or customary in similar transactions at the time
when and the place where the offer is received, unless the terms
The W. H. Anderson Company, 1920), I, secs. 185, 206; 13 Corpus Juris
279.
"1 William Herbert Page, The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Cincinnati, Ohio:
The W. H. Anderson Company, 1920), I, sec. 199.
12 Supra, footnote 9.
'3 161 Mass. 496, 37 N. E. 665, 42 Am. St. Rep. 437 (1894).
14 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts (St.
Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers, 1932), I, secs. 61, 64,
66, 68.
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of the offer or surrounding circumstances known to the offeree
otherwise indicate."
"An acceptance inoperative when dispatched only because
the offeree uses means of transmission which he was not au-
thorized to use is operative when received, if received by the
offeror within the time within which an acceptance sent in an
authorized manner would probably have been received by him."
These sections, then, permit acceptance to be made in the
mode expressly or impliedly indicated by the offeror. If he ex-
pressly prescribes the place, time, or manner of acceptance, this
must be complied with. If he does not do so, then the acceptance
may be made in the same manner as the offer or a manner cus-
tomary at the time and place where the offer is received, unless
the surrounding circumstances known to the offeree indicate a
different mode of acceptance. If these principles are not com-
plied with, the acceptance is effective only when received by the
offeror. The Restatement, then, gives the logical rule in these cases
and should be adopted in toto by the courts. It is flexible enough
to fit any case. It is not based on the fiction of agency or implied
authority, but on fact. If the custom in similar transactions is
to accept such offers in a certain mode, that custom is sanctioned.
This is a recognition of present day methods in the commercial
world. It also is a rule founded on fact, because, despite the
manner in which the offer was made or any custom, if the sur-
rounding circumstances known to the offeree indicate another
mode of acceptance should be used, then unless such other mode
is followed the acceptance can be effective, if at all, only when
received by the offeror.
It is apparent that under either the agency rule or the rule of
implied authorization to use only the same mode in accepting, if
the acceptance of an offer by mail were made by telegram, the
acceptance would complete the contract only when received by
the offeror; because, since the offeree did not select the same
means of communicating his acceptance, there was no delivery
of the acceptance to the "agent" of the offeror nor did the latter
give the offeree "implied authority" to use the telegraph as the
means of communicating his acceptance. 15 Thus, in Dickey v.
Hurd16 the plaintiff, Dickey, mailed an offer from Massachusetts
to the defendant in Georgia offering to sell the latter certain
15 Lucas v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra, footnote 8; Dickey v. Hurd,
33 F. (2d) 415 (1929) ; Shurter v. Ricker, 62 F. (2d) 489 (1933), certiorari
denied without opinion, 289 U. S. 732, 77 L. Ed. 1481, 53 S. Ct. 593 (1933).
16 33 F. (2d) 415 (1929).
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Georgia land. Immediately on receipt of the letter, the plaintiff
wired that he would buy the property subject to survey and
approval of title by his attorneys. Thereafter the defendant
refused to convey because the plaintiff had "not complied with
requirements." In holding that the telegram of acceptance could
be effective only when received, the court stated:
"Where parties are at a distance from one another, and an
offer is sent by mail, it is universally held in this country that
the reply accepting the offer may be sent through the same
medium, and, if it is so sent, the contract will be complete when
the acceptance is mailed, properly addressed, to the party making
the offer and beyond the acceptor's control; the theory being
that, when one makes an offer through the mail, he authorizes the
acceptance to be made through the same medium, and constitutes
that medium his agent to receive his acceptance; that the accept-
ance, when mailed, is then constructively communicated to the
offeror.... But in this case, although the offer was by mail, the
acceptance was by telegraph, and, not being sent through the
same medium, it cannot be said that Mr. Hurd authorized an
acceptance by telegraph and constituted that medium his agent
to receive the acceptance. In this situation the acceptance, when
delivered at the telegraph office, was neither actually nor con-
structively communicated to Mr. Hurd, and the contract was not
consummated, if it was ever consummated, until the telegram
was delivered to Mr. Hlurd in q Ma h isetts. Therefore, if a
contract was consummated, whether unilateral or bilateral, it was
made in Massachusetts; and its validity, construction and effect
are to be determined by the law of that state."
Of course, under either the agency or implied authorization
theory where the offer was made by telegram, an acceptance by
mail would be effective only when received by the offeror. In
those jurisdictions adopting either of these two theories this ques-
tion has not been passed upon by the courts.
On the other hand, under the rules of the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts an acceptance by telegram of an offer by mail
may or may not be effective when transmitted. In fact, the com-
ment under section 66 reads: "a. A method of acceptance may
be customary, although it differs from the method adopted by the
offeror. Thus, under some circumstances acceptance by telegraph,
may be customary, although the offer is by mail. Under other
circumstances the contrary may be true."
The courts adopting the principles of the Restatement in such
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cases are not uniform in the reasons advanced. 17 In Weld Com-
pany v. Victory Manufacturing Company,'8 the plaintiffs were
dealers in cotton in Philadelphia and defendant was a cotton mill
company in North Carolina. They had dealt together for a long
time both by mail and telegraph. On September 7, 1911, the de-
fendant wrote to the plaintiffs: "If the market should recede, you
can buy 300 bales October, November and December at 111/2 cents.
You can accept this as an open order subject to withdrawal
before execution." On September 20 at 10:15 A. M. plaintiffs
deposited with the Western Union Telegraph Company at Phila-
delphia for transmission to defendant a telegram reading: "We
accept your offer eleven one half three hundred mentioned." This
telegram was received by defendant in North Carolina at 12:35
P. M. However, that day, at 9:55 A. m., the defendant had depos-
ited with the telegraph company in North Carolina a telegram
cancelling its offer of September 7. This telegram was not
received by plaintiffs until 10:40 A. M., after they had wired
defendant accepting the offer. In directing a verdict for the
plaintiff, the district court stated:
"The letter of defendant to plaintiffs of September 7, 1911,
was a 'firm offer ...subject to withdrawal before execution.'
When the plaintiffs on September 20th filed with the Telegraph
Company at 10:15 A. m. the telegram accepting the offer, the con-
tract was complete. There was a proposal on the one part, and
an acceptance on the other. The withdrawal of the offer or pro-
posal was not completed by filing with the Telegraph Company
the message at 9:55 A. .- it was only effectual for that purpose,
when received by plaintiffs at 10:40 A. M. The contract is com-
plete 'when the answer containing the acceptance of a distinct
proposition is dispatched by mail or other usual mode of com-
munication . ..and before any intimation is received that the
order is withdrawn. Putting a letter in the mail containing the
acceptance, and thus placing it beyond the control of the party,
is valid as a constructive notice of the acceptance.' 2 Kent, Com.
447; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 13 S. Ct. 811, 866, 37 L.
17 Weld Co. v. Victory Manufacturing Co., 205 F. 770 (1913) ; College
Mill Co. v. Fidler, 58 S. W. 382 (Tenn. Ch., 1899); Perry v. Mount Hope
Iron Co., 15 R. I. 380, 5 A. 632 (1886). See also Grover v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 45 Cal. App. 451, 187 P. 973 (1920) ; Stein-Gray Drug Co. v. H.
Michelson Co., 116 N. Y. S. 789 (1909) ; Trounsine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. 447,
11 P. 441 (1886) ; Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 26
S. Ct. 688, 6 Ann. Cas. 362 (1905). See also case notes: 39 Yale L. J. 424,
Jan., 1930; 18 Cal. L. Rev. 82, Nov., 1929; 15 Cornell L. Q. 273, Feb., 1930;
8 Texas L. Rev. 137, Dec., 1929.
Is 205 F. 770 (Dist. Ct. N. C. 1913).
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Ed. 790; Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 26 S. Ct. 688, 50 L. Ed.
1057, 6 Ann. Cas. 379, and notes; Pollock, Cont. (Wald.) 135."
The court held the acceptance by wire effective when given to
the telegraph company because it was a "usual mode of com-
munication." It said nothing of the previous method of dealing
between the parties by wire and letter or the custom in similar
transactions.
In Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Company,19 the defendant's pur-
chasing agent, Leonard, made an oral offer in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, to the plaintiff's agent that the defendant would pur-
chase iron from the plaintiff at a certain price. The plaintiff's
agent requested that the offer be held open until the next day, to
which Leonard agreed. The next day, the plaintiff telegraphed
from Providence, Rhode Island, accepting the offer. The defend-
ant contended the contract was not complete until the accept-
ance reached him in Boston and was therefore governed by
Massachusetts law and unenforcible under the statute of frauds
of that state. The court held it was a Rhode Island contract and
referring to the case of Household Fire & Carriage Accident
Insurance Company v. Grant20 stated:
"Its doctrine is that the contract is binding on the proposer
as soon as a letter accepting the proposal, properly directed to
him, is posted by the recipient, whether it reaches the proposer
or not, if posted without reasonable delay, and the post is the
ordinary and natural modew of transmitting the acceptance. In
that case the letter did not reach the proposer, and Bramwell,
L. J., who dissented, conceded that, 'where a posted letter ar-
rives, the contract is complete on posting.' In the case at bar
the arrival of the telegram is not disputed. We are of opinion
that the contract, if made, was completed in Rhode Island, not-
withstanding it was to be performed in Massachusetts. Hunt v.
Jones, 12 R. I. 265. If there be any question that the telegraph
is a natural and ordinary mode of transmitting such an accept-
ance, that is a question of fact for the jury; but we are of
opinion that, if it be shown that the acceptance duly reached
the defendant, the question of the mode, no mode having been
specified, is immaterial."
While the offer was oral and not made by mail, it is apparent
from the opinion, that the court would have held the same way
had the offer been mailed.
19 15 R. I. 380, 5 A. 632 (1886).
20 4 Ex. D. 216, 48 L. J. Ex. 577, 41 L. T. 298, 27 W. R. 858, 6 Brit. R.
Cas. 115 (1878).
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The reasons advanced in these and other cases for holding that
the telegram of acceptance completed the contract when delivered
to the telegraph company show that the rules of the Restatement
are much more complete.
Where the offer is sent by telegram, the usual inference is
that that mode of communication was used because a prompt
acceptance was desired. That inference should be read into the
offer so that a slower mode of acceptance, as by mail, would not
be assented to by the offeror. Yet surrounding circumstances
might render acceptance by mail valid when posted. Under sec-
tion 66 of the Restatement an acceptance by mail might or might
not be effective when posted, depending on the facts of the case.
In such cases the courts have followed the rule of the Restate-
ment. In Quenerduaine v. Cole,21 the court held the offer by
telegram was notice that a prompt reply was required and the
acceptance by letter was not in time. But in Farmers' Produce
Company v. Schreiner,2 2 after the offer by telegram was made,
the parties continued negotiations by letter and wire, and then
the offer was accepted by letter. The court held that under the
facts the acceptance was binding, stating:
"After a careful consideration of the few authorities we have
been able to find on the subject, we are of the opinion that the
reasonable and best rule should be, where there is no direction
as to the mode of communicating the acceptance it may be
accomplished through the post office, unless it can be fairly and
reasonably inferred from the offer, or other prior communica-
tions, that some other means is expected, and that would be a
question of fact to be determined by the jury or the trial court."
A case which on hasty reading would seem to be contrary is
Phenix Insurance Company v. Schultz.23 The court held no con-
tract was created when the letter was posted, because the offer
by telegram was conditional and reserved to the insurance agents
the right to determine whether or not the "specific form" was
such as was required by the previous correspondence. The court
did say that if by the telegram such right had not been reserved
"then the claims of appellee that the contract was closed when
the letter of J. B. Moore & Co. of that date was deposited in the
Richmond post office must be conceded. In such cases the au-
thorities almost uniformly hold that the acceptance dates from
21 32 Wkly. Rep. 185 (1883).
22 48 Okla. 488, 150 P. 483, L. R. A. 1916A, 1297 (1915). See also Fer-
guson v. West Coast Shingle Co., 96 Ark. 27, 130 S. W. 527 (1910).
28 80 F. 337 (1897).
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the posting of the letter or the sending of the telegram."
This statement was clearly dictum, and the authorities cited by
the court are cases wherein an offer by mail was accepted by mail
or where an offer by telegram was accepted by telegram. In none
of them was an offer made by wire and accepted by mail.
Of course under either the agency or implied authorization
theories where the offer is made by mail, an acceptance by mail
is effective when posted,24 and if the offer is by telegram, accept-
ance by telegram completes the contract when the message of
acceptance is delivered to the telegraph company.25 Under sec-
tion 26 of the Restatement the acceptance may "be sent by the
means used by the offerer ... unless the terms of the offer or sur-
rounding circumstances known to the offeree otherwise indicate."
This is permissive, however; not mandatory. If acceptance is
sent by a different means, it may still be effective when trans-
mitted if the means selected by the offeree might have been con-
templated by the offeror as a probable means of reply.
M. J. SEYK
RIGHT OF WIFE AND CHILDREN TO REACH INCOME OF SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST CREATED FOR HUSBAND
The recent trend in a few jurisdictions toward liberality in
construing spendthrift trusts where the wife of the cestui at-
tempts to reach the cestui's interest is exemplified in its furthest
limits in the case of Keiipr v. Keller et al.1 This late decision of
the Illinois Appellate Court holds that the grantor of a spend-
thrift trust intends the wife and children of the named cestui to
have a claim upon the trust for support and maintenance unless
express words to the contrary appear in the trust instrument.
The Illinois and Pennsylvania cases relied upon fail to support
the court's position.
The facts of the case are simple. The appellee had obtained a
divorce from a beneficiary of a trust of which the appellants
were trustees. The beneficiary had failed adequately to support
the appellee and the two children of the marriage, and the
Superior Court had ordered the trustees to make certain income
distributions to the appellee. From this order the trustees ap-
pealed, citing the spendthrift clause of the trust instrument. The
24 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (7th ed., New York:
Van Norden & Amerman, 1851), II, 606; Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries
on the Law of Contracts (Chicago: T. H. Flood & Company, 1887), sec.
328; 13 Corpus Juris 300.
25 13 Corpus Juris 298; 47 A. L. R. 159, annotation.
1 284 Ill. App. 198 (1936).
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trust provided in part for a portion of the income to be paid
to the appellee's former husband semiannually or oftener, "each
installment to be paid personally to the child entitled thereto,
and not to be capable of anticipation or assignment." Appellee's
former husband was one of the children referred to.
On this state of facts, the court affirmed the ruling of the lower
court, saying in part: "We hold that because the will creating
this trust fund does not expressly disclose an intention to the
contrary, because the claim for support of children is one which
transcends any contractual obligation, and because of the recog-
nition in our law of the unity of the family, the court did not
err in subjecting the income from this trust fund to the support
of the minor children of the beneficiary." In other words, the
court's reasons are, first, presumed intention of the testator,
second, public policy, and third, identity of the family as a unit.
For support, the court relies chiefly on In Re Moorehead's
Estate,2 England v. England,3 and Tuttle v. Gunderson,4 and it
cites portions of Bogert,5 Griswold,8 and Restatement of Law of
Trusts,7 which review the theory of the Moorehead case and
similar decisions.
The Moorehead decision is the most influential of recent cases
on this subject and is relied upon by both of the Illinois decisions
which came after it. In the Moorehead case, the plaintiff was
the wife of William H. Moorehead (formerly known as William
H; Watt), whose grandmother had left in trust for him her
residuary estate. Moorehead had twice wrongfully deserted the
plaintiff, once to enter a bigamous marriage, the second time to
live in adultery with the plaintiff's sister-in-law. The plaintiff
then sought a writ directing the trustees of the grandmother's
residuary estate to pay for her support from funds due her hus-
band. The trustees relied upon the following spendthrift clause
appearing in the will:
"I will and direct that neither the income payable to my
grandson, William H. Watt, nor the corpus from which the same
is derived, shall be liable to or for the contracts or debts of said
William H. Watt, or -to execution or to attachments at the suit
2 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A. L. R. 1251 (1927).
3 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922).
4 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929), dismissed on appeal on other grounds, 341 Ill.
36, 173 N. E. 175 (1930).
5 George G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Pub. Co., 1935), I, 727, sec. 223.
6 Griswold's Spendthrift Trusts, Ch. V, p. 292, secs. 331-340 (1936).
7 Restatement of Law of Trusts, I, p. 389, sec. 157.
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of any of his creditors; but shall be absolutely free from the
same, and he shall have no power to sell, assign or incumber
the same or any part thereof, or to in any way anticipate the
said income."
The plaintiff and Moorehead had married several years before
the grandmother died, and the plaintiff was known to the grand-
mother, but she was not referred to by name or description in
the will.
The court found for the plaintiff in a lengthy decision giving
three reasons for its ruling-the three reasons picked up in the
Keller case and adapted to suit its facts. The first basis for the
decision was that the testatrix intended the plaintiff to be a
beneficiary of the trust. The court recited that the plaintiff was
not mentioned in the will but the court relied upon the general
pious intent evidenced in the will and upon the use of the word
"all" in the part of the will where the testatrix said, "I hope you 8
may live an undivided happy family ... and hope and expect to
meet you all on the other shore, where parting is no more. .... "
The second basis given for the decision was that, because the
testatrix could not anticipate them, she had not provided for
circumstances which had arisen and which would make the pro-
visions found in the will void because contrary to public policy.
This standard objection to spendthrift trusts was raised by the
court in words characteristic of the whole decision. "To ignore
or dismiss this controlling factor," the court said, "would be to
attach the seal of judicial approval to the misconduct of this
respondent against his deserted wife and grant him a commis-
sion of right to continue those offenses and persist in his career
of shamelessness and criminality, in which the crimes of bigamy
and adultery signal his triumphs as a violator of law and of
public morals."
As a third basis for its decree, the court distinguished between
obligations arising from marriage status and obligations arising
from ordinary contracts and found that the testatrix 's direction
that the income should not be liable "for the contracts or debts
of said William H. Watt" did not exempt the income from liabil-
ity for what the court termed the "fundamental duty" of the
beneficiary to support his wife.9
s Who is meant by "you" is not indicated in the decision.
9 The decision is an example of a hard case that makes bad law. The court
says in justification of its finding, "Certainly property available for the pur-
poses of pleasure or profit should be also answerable to the demands of jus-
tice." But if the wife is permitted to reach the trust income here, are not
NOTES AND COMMENTS
It should be noted that the first basis, that is, the finding as a
fact that the testatrix intended to include the wife as a bene-
ficiary, along with Moorehead, is a sufficient basis for the de-
cision and that the second and third grounds are unnecessary.
The second ground, public policy, was given chiefly as a justifi-
cation of the decision. And the third point, dwelling on the duty
of a husband to support his family, is raised chiefly to show
that the spendthrift clause did not expressly exclude the trust
income from the reach of the wife.
Referring back to the three reasons given in the Keller case,
one finds that they are parallel to the Moorehead theory. The
first deals with intention, the second with public policy, and the
third with the common law view of marriage as a status rather
than a mere contract. The public policy argument is equally
strong or equally weak in both cases and is matter in justifica-
tion. But the first and third points in the Moorehead case are
essentially findings of fact after construing the testatrix 's will,
yet the Keller case treats them as matters of law.
Proceeding to the other two cases relied upon as precedent for
the Keller decision, one finds that each court made an affirmative
finding of fact that the testator intended the wife of the cestui,
though not expressly mentioned, to benefit along with the cestui.
The England case relied partly upon a provision that the income
go to the issue of the cestui, if he should die leaving issue, and the
Gunderson case relied upon the provision, among others, that
the trustees help the cestui "in all lawful matters whatsoever."
However strained the constructions may have been, the courts
did find in each case that the testator included the wife along
with the named cestui, and they did not hold, as does the Keller
case, that the wife was included because she was not expressly
excluded.
In noting the position of other jurisdictions in relation to the
Moorehead and Keller decisions, one finds numerous cases where
courts have been liberal in construing trust instruments to in-
clude a wife with a named cestui, but generally they do not go so
others entitled to the same privilege? Could not an invalid sister qualify as
one of the "undivided happy family"? Could not an unemployed brother
qualify, or a bankrupt uncle? Would, also, the court give the same decision
for the benefit of a wife who was unknown to the testatrix or who married
the beneficiary after the testatrix's death? So far as public policy is con-
cerned, the husband's refusal to pay his tailor is contrary to public morals
and public policy. And, on the third point, that the obligation to support a
wife is not a debt, the local tax collector could use the same argument in
asking the trustees to pay the cestui's taxes.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
far as the Pennsylvania court did1 ° and no case speaks of the
presumption of law set out in the Keller decision.
Iowa found no such presumption in one case where a wife
sought to reach the interest of her husband as cestui of a spend-
thrift trust1 1 and, in a case where a former wife sought to sub-
ject to a decree for alimony certain property impressed with a
valid spendthrift trust for the benefit of her former husband,
it was held that an alimony decree has no better standing than
any other money judgment.
12
In a New Hampshire case where the trustee of a spendthrift
trust had been given power by the will to pay out income accord-
ing to the needs of the cestui, the court said that the trustee had
authority to make payments for the support of the cestui's wife
and children.13 "As the needs of a married man are sometimes
con strued," the court said, "they include not only his needs, but
also the needs of his family."
Decided on narrow ground, a much cited New York case,
Wetmore v. Wetmore,'1 4 contains dictum that has been quoted to
support liberal construction of spendthrift trusts. The case was
decided under a New York statute providing that the income of
a spendthrift trust beyond what is necessary for the support
of the beneficiary shall be liable in equity to the claim of his
creditors. The former wife of the cestui in question, having an
alimony judgment against the cestui and having unsuccessfully
exhausted legal methods of reaching the cestui's property, re-
sorted to equity under the statute. It was found that she could,
under the statute, reach the income of the trust, none of which
was actually necessary for the cestui's support. The phrase of
the court that, "Equity will not feed the husband and starve the
wife," has been a favorite in this type of case ever since.
The California case of San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v.
Heustis,15 which presents the stricter view of the question and
reaches a result opposite to that of the Keller case, contains an
able review of the leading cases on the subject.
10 The Moorehead case is followed in Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super.
578, 172 A. 36 (1934).
11 Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185 Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590 (1919).
12 DeRouse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N. W. 896 (1917).
13 Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 A. 433, reported as Eaton v.
Loveren in 35 A. L. R. 1034 (1924). For another case construing the
testator's intent in the light of the wife's claim, see Gardner v. O'Loughlin, 76
N. H. 481, 84 A. 935 (1912).
14 149 N. Y. 520, 44 N. E. 169, 33 L. R. A. 708, 52 Am. St. Rep. 752
(1896).
15 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. (2d) 158 (1932).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
As an example of a spendthrift clause which puts the beneficial
interest of the trust beyond the reach of the cestui's wife, the
Pennsylvania decision Board of Charities and Correction v.
Lockard16 is noteworthy. Here the spendthrift clause read, in
part, "All moneys or legacies herein bequeathed are to be paid
to the legatees in person, and to no one else. . . ." This portion
of the clause has been cited frequently as one which, under all
circumstances, would prevent the cestui's wife from reaching his
interest.
The case is significant also in its refusal to relax the law of
spendthrift trusts or construction of trust instruments on
grounds of public policy. "We agree entirely," the court said,
"with all that has been said about the duty of the beneficiary to
support his wife and child; but that does not authorize inter-
ference with the right of another individual to dispose of his own
property as he may see fit." This principle seems to have been
lost sight of in the Keller case.
H. MACDONALD
16 198 Pa. 572, 48 A. 496, 82 Am. St. Rep. 817 (1901).
